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progress, constantly in a dialectical relation of both challenging 
and being challenged by the order of things.
On one Internet site, “I Am Not Trayvon Martin” is headed 
“She Speaks Truth.” This burdensome tribute allows entry into 
some closing thoughts concerning pedagogy, the white anti-
racist scholar, and the Black anti-racist scholar. Certainly the 
truth of the video is one that did not originate among whites. 
One of the most challenging remarks directed towards my 
lectures on whiteness takes a similar form. After talks as an 
invited lecturer I am regularly taken aside by a listener of color 
who thanks me for saying “things like what I’ve been saying 
myself” but without being heard. The praise was gratifying on 
the first few hearings but it also troubles matters, sometimes 
designedly so. That is, the praise underlines that whiteness 
structures who gets believed and esteemed even in discussing 
whiteness. Moreover the “things like what I’ve been saying” 
phrasing underlines, subconsciously perhaps, how much 
white writers on whiteness borrow from long traditions of 
such study by thinkers from groups for whom whiteness has 
most murderously been a problem. For me, trained in African 
American history, debts to Toni Morrison, Sterling Stuckey, 
Langston Hughes, Ida B. Wells, bell hooks, and, among many 
others, above all James Baldwin and W.E.B. Du Bois, can be 
acknowledged but cannot be fully repaid.
“Like what I have been saying” also helps us to understand 
that what is being said is also not just the same across the color 
line and this conditions reception. I have disappointed the 
shows of Bill O’Reilly, Glenn Beck, and other right-wing media 
figures who regularly discover the existence of “Whiteness 
Studies” courses and want to ridicule on television someone 
teaching one. I have never taught courses on the critical study of 
whiteness as in my view whiteness cannot be understood apart 
from the experiences of peoples racialized as not white. Thus, 
when my students read about whiteness they do so as part of 
courses on ethnic studies. In the fascinating class sessions on 
whiteness that Yancy describes, his expertise and experience 
ensure that a course centered on whiteness is about a social 
relationship.
I do lecture frequently on whiteness visiting in other 
cities. When I do, the sorts of direct expressions of doubt and 
opposition from the audience that Yancy recounts rarely surface 
during the lecture, the Q and A that follows, or talks with faculty 
and students over meals. Opposition is generally expressed 
via email, anonymously, rarely, and after the fact. Tears are 
very occasional, most recently when I argued against the idea 
of “white culture” and a Missouri student cried, “If I can’t be 
white, what can I be?”
Years ago, as I was thinking about the coexistence of white 
young people’s love of Black culture and their racism, I asked an 
African American colleague to help me to sort the question out. 
He then went to speak at a local high school and briefly mused 
on how it was that cheerleaders there might go to the “more 
Black,” urban high school to see dance moves but not want 
to attend an integrated school. The results included disorder 
in the gym, a vicious campaign against him in the newspaper, 
and threats. I could have spoken those same lines with only 
sullenness and silent dismissal as the result. Such a positionality 
makes my life easier but troublingly so. It makes my teaching 
about whiteness more predictable and less impactful than that 
described in Look, a White!
On Why I Keep Getting [Socially] Interrupted 
by White People
Grant J. Silva
Marquette University
I read Look, a White! in various coffee shops and libraries 
throughout Los Angeles, California, and Buffalo, New York. 
Never has a book in my hand attracted so much attention. 
Written across the light blue cover the word “White” stands 
out in large print and rests above an index finger pointed 
upward. This somehow manages to antagonize passersby while 
simultaneously creating a sense of what can only be called 
“entitled curiosity.” On several occasions, I was interrupted by 
strangers who glanced at the cover of the book and could not 
resist asking questions or making comments: “What are you 
reading?” “What is that book about?” “Wow, that seems like 
an interesting topic…” and, eventually, “Who wrote that book?” 
Most appeared shocked and, to be quite honest, suspicious that 
I was reading about whiteness, maybe because I am Latino. 
They were even more surprised that the book’s author is African 
American. “I don’t see what a Black man can know about 
whiteness” summarizes most of the responses.
Soon after I finished the text I realized that this is exactly 
what George Yancy wants. Look, a White! challenges readers 
to “nominalize” the various ways whiteness permeates their 
life and our society: “Nomination brings attention to, discloses, 
renders ethically problematic, a network of iterative power 
relations, normative assumptions, and calcified modes of 
being that are created and defined by whiteness” (23). In this 
sense, the suspicion I perceived might not have anything to do 
with my identity but the fact that whiteness is being discussed 
openly and honestly throughout an entire text, especially one 
written by a Black man.
Nominalizing whiteness is crucial to combating the 
evolving, dynamic nature of racism. In today’s “progressive” 
era, people are often comfortable talking about race when 
it pertains to the ways in which minorities are negatively 
impacted and socially determined by unjust socioeconomic 
and political forces. Yancy’s text, however, “flips the script” 
and, in doing so, shows how nuanced his argument is. Look, A 
White! nominalizes whiteness by highlighting the ways in which 
race positively impacts those who tend to think of themselves 
as race-less, namely, whites. The positive impact that race has 
on the lives of white people comes at the expense of those 
who are denied social goods and various forms of recognition, 
namely, racialized minorities. Anti-Black racism is thus “socially 
axiomatic” in social spaces where whiteness is taken for granted 
and constitutes the norm (19). This is what Naomi Zack labeled 
“whiteness-as-antiblack-racism” (x).
Yancy’s text demonstrates how racism always accompanies 
whiteness, regardless of whether white people intend on being 
racist. A common response to the charge of racism is that 
one cannot be racist since there are no races. This sentiment 
appeals to the non-reality of race in order to abate the detection 
of racism. Here, discussions pertaining to the ontological 
status of race often serve as a red herring to exploring the 
lived significance of racism. Yancy subverts this maneuver 
by “bracketing”1 or suspending questions pertaining to the 
ontological status of race, i.e., the nonreferential status of 
the concept (17). This bracketing allows for reflection upon 
mundane social interactions and embodied social phenomena, 
those very places that so many people think of as race-less, often 
because they do not intend any harm or because whiteness 
constitutes the norm (which is why the book is about naming 
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whiteness). Yancy writes, “My point is twofold. First, to restrict 
the problem of race to conceptual analysis full stop is too 
limiting. Second, an exploration of race as lived takes one 
beyond what is thought about in the abstract to the level of 
how race is meaningfully lived as an embodied and messy 
phenomenon” (19).
This book, however, is not just about identifying whiteness 
in its various manifestations. Much like in Black Bodies, White 
Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race (2008), Yancy argues 
that anti-Black racism reveals more about white identity than 
the actual nature of Black people. Whiteness implies structures 
of domination, institutional and classical forms of racism, and 
asymmetrical social relations that hinder human subjectivity-
formation for both whites and Blacks (not to mention “others”). 
The insidious nature of whiteness is the way it obscures these 
structures of domination and perverse social relations, thus 
eliding social critique and political rectification.
For the author, the sinister description “Look, a Negro!” 
should read: “Look, a projection of white fears, insecurity and 
hate, but something desperately needed for white identity 
(a.k.a. a ‘Negro’)!” Yancy tells the reader,
At the heart of whiteness is a profound disavowal: “I 
am not that!” In other words, whiteness is secured 
through marking what it is not. Yet what it (whiteness) 
is not (blackness in this case) is a false construction 
that whites themselves have created to sustain their 
false sense of themselves as ontologically superior. 
However, it is a form of superiority that involves the 
subordination of their freedom. (20)
Predicated on the via negativa (that which it is not), whiteness 
requires anti-whiteness as a constituting facet of white identity. 
More specifically, whiteness needs Blackness for its existence.2 
“Whiteness gains its ontological purchase,” Yancy explains, 
“through the construction and degradation of nonwhiteness. 
Thus, to ‘authenticate’ their whiteness, they [whites] must 
enact a form of white solipsism whereby the nonwhite is erased 
and devalued, reduced to a form of nonbeing” (116-117). The 
“solipsistic” dimension of this problem—which I return to 
below—becomes visible when one realizes that “Blackness” 
is a construct of white lies about the Black body. 
Disabusing the lies that are told about the Black body 
is perhaps the work of those thinkers concerned with the 
ontological status of race, which begs the question as to whether 
one can completely separate abstract discussions from the 
lived-density project. Put differently, the experience of racism 
is so severe that it is almost impossible to completely place 
the nonreferential status of “race” on hold. As Yancy explains, 
“In a form of sociality that is fundamentally structured by race 
and racism, black people . . . undergo ontological truncating 
traumatic experiences in the face of white others who refuse to 
recognize their humanity. In short, blacks are reduced to their 
epidermis, and so the experience of black people vis-à-vis race/
racism presupposes the existence of white others” (19). Is the 
racialized Black body, that which is “truncated” and marked 
as inferior, necessary for racist sentiment? If so, racists need 
to denigrate the Black body in order to bolster their racism. 
Racism thus attempts to render people objects, it permeates 
the ontological status of Black people. My question, then, is 
whether or not the lived-density of “race,” that which is explored 
using the phenomenological analysis, always reverts back to 
its referential status?
If a positive formulation of whiteness is possible, one 
that does not depend upon the suppression, domination, 
and misrecognition of Otherness, then it remains to be seen. 
While the average white person walking down the street may 
not be the progenitor of this perverse social dependency, they 
are implicated in racism in several ways. Just how they are 
implicated is the main question that follows.
Yancy pushes the reader to rethink both the explicit and 
implicit forms of racism/whiteness perpetuated by our existence 
in this racist world. Racism, in this view, is like original sin within 
the Christian tradition.3 It is a sin imposed upon us by the actions 
of those who came before. Even though we may not have bitten 
any apple, all are held accountable on the basis of simply being 
born of flesh. Unlike original sin, however, no baptism shall 
cleanse one of whiteness and the racism that comes along with 
it. Rather than be dismissive or overly compensatory, Yancy 
asks white people to dwell on their whiteness, to give thought 
to a topic where usually there is none.4 To dwell on whiteness 
is not to dismiss the question of racism in light of one’s lack 
of racist intent or appeals to meritocracy. Similarly, quietism in 
response to the inability to shed one’s self of racism cannot be 
an option. Wrestling with the fact that one may never be capable 
of ridding herself of racism or, for that matter, whiteness, and 
seeing this as a “problem” is what Yancy desires. This is no easy 
task and there may be no way of saving oneself from whiteness, 
nor is it Yancy’s job to provide hope that something like that is 
possible (174-175).
Through the use of the phenomenological tradition and 
recognition theories of human subjectivity-formation, white 
people are offered the opportunity to gain a critical consciousness 
that reveals how white identity is indebted to racism and 
racialized Others. For Yancy, human identity does not form in a 
vacuum, nor are we the atomistic, unencumbered self of much 
of modern thought. Instead, humans are social beings, and our 
social nature has a determinant effect on our agency. We are 
born into a world we did not create, we come to terms with 
ourselves in languages that we did not found, and we inherit 
social positions that are not of our doing.5 Human agency may 
still exist in varying degrees depending upon an assortment of 
factors (i.e., class, gender, nationality, one’s relationship to white 
privilege), but we are not free to define ourselves from nothing. 
How we recognize ourselves, are recognized by others, and the 
continuity or discontinuity stemming from these interactions is 
crucial to Yancy’s critique of whiteness.
More important, as the chapter on pedagogy suggests, is 
the understanding of the self as a work in progress transformed 
and shaped through intersubjective social situations that often 
force growth through discomfort. “Philosophy is not about 
technocratic control in my classrooms but about practices of 
dialogical mutual freedom, dialogical reciprocity, and forms of 
communicative emancipation that are not afraid to walk the 
edge of danger to concede that one was mistaken—indeed 
blatantly so” (133). Whiteness distorts, obviates, and even mutes 
the unfolding of the self, both in the classroom and in everyday 
social interactions. While whites and Blacks are impacted by 
this stultification, the former do not realize the extent of the 
limitations and in fact benefit by not knowing this.
Whiteness requires a non-dialectic, sometimes called an 
epistemic monologue or what Enrique Dussel calls an “anti-
dialogue.”6 Whiteness does this through the projection and 
imposition of white ideas about what African Americans are like 
or supposed to be, what Yancy calls “white solipsism.” White 
solipsism occurs when whites expect African Americans to be 
nothing more than stereotypic imaginings of Blacks as criminals, 
welfare recipients, drug dealers, gang members, and the like. 
Yancy brilliantly describes this as “anterior guilt” (2). Reflecting 
on Frantz Fanon’s experience of being singled out by a young 
white boy as a “Negro,” Yancy writes:
Fanon has done nothing save be a Negro. Yet this 
is sufficient. The Negro has always already done 
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something by virtue of being a Negro. It is an anterior 
guilt that always haunts the Negro and his or her 
present and future actions. After all, that is what it 
means to be a Negro—to have done something wrong. 
The little white boy’s utterance is felicitous against 
a backdrop of white lies and myths about the black 
body. (2)
Notice the use of “always already,” a phrase employed at least 
twelve times throughout the text. Like the idea of “arriving 
already,” which Yancy also relies upon to describe the feeling 
of being represented before having a chance to speak for one’s 
self, “always already” does the work of explaining the way 
African Americans are claimed by white ideas about them.
The nature of time in the racist world becomes an 
interesting issue at this point, especially the “anteriority” or 
“claimed” nature of Black people. In white solipsism whites 
are seemingly the only people who temporally advance or 
develop, albeit through their own projections. Blacks remain 
caught in a vicious web of deceit about what they are supposed 
to be (past tense). One can easily see how this connects with 
the idea of an inferior, historicized Black body, as opposed to 
the modern white self of the future, the only being capable 
of making history and not just being a part of it.7 Rather than 
actually encounter and exchange with a Black person, which 
would allow an authentic dialogue to unfold, whites simply 
resort to expectations about African Americans. This is a 
form of idealism; one is not actually engaging with the real 
world or other people, but only ideas. Nonetheless, this is an 
idealism that is very real, as Trayvon Martin’s murder reminds 
us. Being stuck in their own solipsistic world, whites limit their 
social and personal development. White identity formation is 
inchoate. Given the resentment and resistance Yancy receives 
from his students, one might think that most white people 
are comfortable in this half-baked state (which is why Yancy 
seeks to disrupt this continuity). White solipsism results in a 
suspension of human social development. It is the denial of 
humanity in the white self and the racialized other.
For African Americans who are forced to live, or at least 
have to contend with on a daily basis, white projections of 
fear, hate, and insecurity, being misrecognized does not allow 
them to fully blossom into human beings. Black subjectivity is 
also muted, stunted, hindered, and handcuffed. The operative 
modes of whiteness hold us back from realizing our common 
humanity. It is whiteness that is the problem, a form of laziness. 
One is too lazy to be human in the sense that one does not want 
to or has been conditioned to ignore other people. At what point 
this complacency or laziness becomes morally reprehensible 
is where the debate ensues.
“Fanon is clear,” Yancy writes, “that the white boy, while 
not fully realizing the complex, historical, psychological, and 
phenomenological implications, has actually distorted his 
(Fanon’s) body.” He continues, “The white boy, though, is not a 
mere innocent proxy for whiteness. Rather, he is learning, at that 
very moment, the power of racial speech, the power of racial 
gesturing. He is learning how to think about and feel toward the 
so-called dark Other. He is undergoing white subject formation, 
a formation that is fundamentally linked to the object that he 
fears and dreads” (3). Notice that some culpability lies with the 
boy’s actions (he “is not a mere innocent proxy”). However, 
as Yancy argues, the boy’s racial practices are “learned 
effortlessly,” which is to say that “the white boy’s performance 
points to fundamental ways in which many white children are 
oriented, at the level of everyday practices, within the world, 
where their bodily orientations are unreflected expressions of 
the background lived orientations of whiteness, white ways of 
being, white modes of racial and racist practice” (3).
I point out the tension between the boy’s culpability and 
the fact that his racism is learned effortlessly, imposed from 
outside. Many readers will object to this idea. The claim is that 
the child is heteronomous, socialized into his racist views. Yet 
this does not fit with Yancy’s thoughts. He argues that the boy 
is not just the product of a “superimposed superstructural grid 
of racist ideology” (3). The boy’s very comportment in a racist 
world constitutes a form of racism. It is now too late for the boy; 
he is doomed to be a racist. There may be varying degrees of 
racism, but no escape from its grips.
Look, A White! problematizes debates on the nature and 
ethics of racism, which, in Yancy’s view, is something that 
exceeds questions of ill will, maliciousness, and hatred.8
Racism inhabits a shared social space where often times 
people do not intend on being racist, they just are. It is “etched” 
into their being (61). More specifically, however, the culpability 
lies in failing to recognize their whiteness (perhaps?). They are 
responsible for their ignorance or failure to know. This is a tough 
point that not many whites will accept. I can see some people 
being on board with the idea that they are culpable if they live 
in bad faith and acknowledge their privilege but do not care to 
do anything about it. Similarly, if whiteness does depend upon 
the domination of Otherness, that too will implicate the white 
boy in racist activity in a “noncontroversial” way (similar to how 
I am implicated in sweatshop labor by buying Nike). But where 
exactly does racist behavior become culpable in the case of 
Fanon’s interaction with the boy? While it may be one thing to 
say that it is a messy situation, this is not an argument that will 
hold when holding people responsible for their actions.
Overall, Yancy’s project is commendable, especially for its 
phenomenological analysis of race and racism. Let me give one 
more example that attempts to show how embedded racism is 
in our culture and why only the phenomenological analysis can 
reach the depths of this kind of prejudice. Yancy argues that 
the racist world we live in is a product of radical contingency; 
we do not have to inhabit a world of white privilege: “There is, 
however, no historical inevitability that necessitates the accrual 
of white hegemony and the power of the white gaze to position 
and subordinate nonwhites. White power and privilege are 
fundamentally contingent. The scopic hegemony of whiteness 
is grounded in structural, historical, and material processes of 
subjugation, dispossession and imperial invasion” (110). This is 
an important point to remember since people tend to view civil 
rights movements and progressive moments in history in a light 
that is only possible in the wake of racism. What I mean is that 
in order for many people to fully appreciate something like our 
first Black president, a history of colonization, slavery, lynching, 
Jim Crow, and other atrocious events is required. In other words, 
history tends to be viewed as teleological, and racism is rendered 
necessary for our current appreciation of the world as it is. If that 
is the case, what about the lives of those who died for the sake 
of our unique appreciation of Obama’s accomplishment? When 
it comes to racism this deeply embedded, we must not brook 
any theodicies. Yancy will not let us.
Written in a prose that is inspiring, eloquent, and alive 
(just see his comments on speaking in clicks, p. 30), Yancy’s 
text guides the reader through an assortment of chapters on 
the embedded nature of whiteness, drawing examples from 
post-colonial literature, popular culture, and film (an entire 
chapter on the movie White Chicks!). Along the way, the author 
initiates helpful discussions about the various pedagogical 
issues and academic dangers that come with asking people 
to think seriously about whiteness and racism in historically 
white universities. I highly recommend this text to philosophers 
interested in the nature of whiteness and the complex question 
of racism.
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Endnotes
1. I am importing the term “bracketing.” Here, the Husserlian 
phenomenological roots of Yancy’s project become obvious.
2. In my forthcoming manuscript, Thinking about Justice from 
“The Outside” of Nationality: Re-Examining the Legal and 
National Dimensions of Citizenship, I argue that nationalism 
and legal constructions of citizenship operate in a similar 
fashion to Yancy’s views on whiteness. The ideas of “nation” 
and legal personhood have no meaning outside of their 
exclusive nature that denies membership or rights to those 
born outside the state.
3. Yancy first made a comparison between racism and original 
sin in “Elevators, Social Spaces and Racism” (Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 34 [2008]). He writes, “My dark body 
occludes the presumption of innocence. It is as if one’s 
Blackness is a congenital defect, one that burdens the body 
with tremendous inherited guilt. On this reading, one might 
say that Blackness functions metaphorically as original sin. 
There is not anything as such that a Black body needs to do 
in order to be found blameworthy” (847).
4. See Chapter 6, especially p. 157 (bottom paragraph).
5. This last point will set up the objection many of Yancy’s 
students level against him, namely, “I didn’t own slaves and 
we didn’t create the oppressive social position that African 
Americans inherit; therefore, I’m not implicated in anti-black 
racism.” Although these are not of our doing, one can be 
implicated in the maintenance of these social positions, 
which begs the question as to the nature of racism (I will 
return to this below).
6. See Enrique Dussel, Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin 
of Philosophical Anti-Discourse of Modernity, trans. George 
Ciccariello-Maher, www.enriquedussel.org (accessed April 
5, 2010). Another idea that Dussel can offer Yancy is that of 
analectics (“ano” and “logos,” the reason from beyond). 
Dussel uses this idea to offer ways of getting past solipsistic 
monologues, especially those of modernity. Rather than 
attempt to find something of one’s self in the other (to 
render something the “same” and thus obviate the alterity), 
analectics is the reason from an-Other. It is the voice of the 
Other who speaks from a position of oppression (a necessary 
condition) and thus forces growth in the self.
7. White temporality depends upon that of blackness. Although 
this may be a semantic issue, I do not agree with the 
idea of “alterRenaissance” (see 87-93). In the chapter on 
colonial semiotics (chapter 3), the idea of alterRenaissance 
is introduced to explain how contemporeneous with the 
development of modern humanisms and the modern self 
is an alternative script about the inferiority of the colonized. 
In line with Latin American philosophers, I see modern 
humanisms as dependent upon the colonized. The colonized 
as inferior is a constituent factor, not a coterminous event. 
See Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse 
of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity, trans. Michael D. 
Baber (New York: Continuum, 1995).
8. For a classic account of racism that hinges on intent and 
hatred, see J.L.A. Garcia’s “The Heart of Racism,” Journal of 
Social Philosophy 27 (1996): 5-46. I often teach this essay in 
conjunction with chapters from Yancy’s Black Bodies, White 
Gazes. Garcia’s Kantian/Catholic views on racism make for 
good comparison with Yancy’s phenomenological perspective.
The Pleasures of Dialogue: Responses to My 
Interlocutors
George Yancy
Duquesne University
I edited Cornel West: A Critical Reader in 2001. It is the first book 
in American history to explore the multifaceted philosophical 
work of a living African American philosopher by, in this case, 
his colleagues. As I stated then, the text was not to divinize 
Cornel West, but to engage his work critically; indeed, to respect 
his work through the activity of discursive engagement. In his 
own lengthy and meta-philosophically insightful contribution to 
that text, “Philosophy and the Funk of Life,” West writes, “How 
sweet it is to be taken seriously by one’s colleagues and friends 
in our fast-paced world of superficial praise and supercilious 
putdown! How joyous it is to encounter critics who actually 
have read one’s work in a careful and cautious manner.” In 
stream with West, I would like to thank the six contributors 
who eagerly agreed to read Look, a White! Philosophical Essays 
on Whiteness and to give a careful and cautious reading of 
the text. It is with the same careful and cautious reading that 
I respond to their reviews. My hope is that this exchange will 
bear important philosophical fruit and stimulate further critical 
dialogue. I found each of the reviews to be honest, critical, 
and insightful. I am honored by such a critical cadre. I take 
responsibility for any errors in exegesis, faulty inferences, or 
blatant misunderstandings.
Taine Duncan begins her insightful review by pulling from 
Greek mythology, stating that just as Theseus betrayed Ariadne, 
she is capable of repaying my work with thoughtlessness. 
This sort of opening disclosure is what makes for mutual 
vulnerability. The importance, in this case, of a white woman 
admitting to betrayals vis-à-vis discussing my work on whiteness 
is a fruitful place to begin. Indeed, Taine’s admission is logically 
connected to the important and indefatigable need to mark 
whiteness: Look, a white! As white, one has all sorts of reasons 
to engage in betrayal. After all, whiteness has a proclivity to elide 
its own complicity in white racist structures and practices. Part 
of this self-marking is excellently performed where Duncan 
writes, “It is easy as a white woman to say that I was never part 
of the legacy of slaveholding since women were not allowed 
to be property owners either. I have more in common with the 
slave than the white man, right? Look, a white!— Me!” And at 
the very end of her review, she writes “Look, a White!” after 
describing how she thinks, as a white woman philosopher 
teaching race theories, my book would work well in the 
classroom as a resource manual for both undergraduate and 
graduate students. By ending with “Look, a White!” she again 
marks her whiteness as a site of opacity and possible ambush. 
In this way, she nicely enacts some of the critical dimensions 
of the text, applying to her own whiteness. She argues that 
my work enacted “a sophisticated negative dialectics of 
racism.” I appreciate her comparison here as I think that this 
is an insightful one. I think that in terms of conceptualizing 
whiteness/racism, there is a sense in which the complexity of 
lived whiteness/racism leaves an excess and that we must call 
into question the idea that antiracism is a concept that can be 
mastered and performed successfully through some process 
of Cartesian epistemic transparency.
Contrary to Duncan’s assessment that it is a book of essays 
as opposed to a singular argument, I would argue that while it 
is true this it is a book composed of essays this does not ipso 
facto mean that it does not constitute a singular argument, 
though one with multiple examples and diverse points of 
analysis. She does say, though, that it is clear that Ariadne’s 
thread traces from the introduction through all six chapters. I 
would agree, however, that chapter three, which looks at the 
work of Kamau Brathwaite vis-à-vis whiteness, does have a 
sort of “independence.” I see this especially in terms of style 
and its use of magical realism. Yet, the chapter was designed 
to deploy Brathwaite’s work within the discursive framework 
of the text, which was to mark whiteness, but to do so within 
a colonial context. I appreciate Duncan’s reading and unique 
interpretation of that chapter as “a wonderfully subversive 
